This article explores the impact of the police action and the anti-communist struggle in Hyderabad on the formation of the Indian state in the first years after independence. Because of its central location and diverse cultural heritage, the absorption of the princely state of Hyderabad into the Indian Union was an important goal for Nehru's government. But the task of bringing Hyderabad into the Union was not an easy one. As it entered Hyderabad, the government of independent India had to come to terms with the limitations of the police, military and bureaucracy which it had inherited from the colonial state. As it took over the governance of the state, it had to find ways to manage relations between Hindus and Muslims, even as the social order was being transformed. And it had to fight communism in the Telangana region of the state, whilst trying to ensure the loyalty of its new citizens. This article examines the ways in which India's first government confronted these complex problems. The following pages argue that these early years must be seen as a time of great dynamism, rather than as a period of stability inherited from the colonial state.
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There is near consensus amongst scholars of postcolonial India that, at least in retrospect, the Nehruvian period was one of relative calm and stability. According to this line of thought, independence did herald change in India, including the introduction of democracy with universal suffrage and a constitution with a charter of fundamental rights, but the trauma of partition, the war over Kashmir and the integration of the princely states, 'ensured that precisely those traits of the Raj which Indian nationalists had struggled against were now reinforced'. 1 The police, military and bureaucracy inherited from the colonial regime, it is agreed, enabled the Congress-led government to 'enforce central authority', and to ensure stability in a unified Indian state. 2 The following pages challenge this view by examining the integration of the princely state of Hyderabad into the Indian Union. It is argued that this view posthumously invests the colonial state/early postcolonial state with qualities it did not have. The idea that the colonial state acted as a monolithic machine to stamp out dissent and disorder where it pleased is unsustainable. Central policy was often fraught with contradictions. Institutions, especially the police, courts and prisons, were often overwhelmed by the work thrust upon them during times of unrest. Tensions between the centre and local administrators frequently erupted, as officers used their position as 'the man on the spot' to act contrary to orders or to justify committing acts of violence against the subject population. Taken as a whole, therefore, the colonial state was often either weak and inefficient or extraordinarily violent and ineffective. 3 By taking the absorption of Hyderabad as a case study, this work examines the ways in which the new government coped with its inheritance.
Hitherto, the story of the integration of the princely state of Hyderabad into the Indian Union has been told from a number of relatively parochial perspectives. There have 6 and histories of the communist Telangana movement in the territory. 7 None of these accounts, however, have examined the impact of the integration of Hyderabad on the formation of the state in newly independent India.
The absorption of Hyderabad provides an excellent study of the nature of the postcolonial Indian state for three reasons. First, Hyderabad had been part of the calculations of all-India political parties at least since the 1930s. 8 The territory was therefore a vital part of the self-image of newly-independent India. Secondly, it was the Ministry of States, part of the central government in Delhi, which assumed overall responsibility for the integration of the former princely states. After the police action of September 1948, the Hyderabad regime was virtually disbanded. As a result, the new authorities had relative freedom to shape the new territory as they pleased.
Finally, as Hyderabad was brought into the Union, police, military and members of the bureaucracy were drafted in from the rest of India to rebuild Hyderabad. One can therefore use the case of Hyderabad not only to try to understand the 'mind' of the central government, but to examine the extent to which policies designed by the centre were successfully implemented on the ground.
When they assumed power in Hyderabad, the new Indian government faced an array of questions the answers to which would impact the shape and character of the new nation-state as a whole. These included, how to deal with the limitations of the military, police, and bureaucracy which they had inherited; how to frame the new constitution to protect the integrity of the country; how to manage relations between Hindus and Muslims, whether in the bureaucracy or in the population; and how to fight communism and ensure the loyalty of their new citizens. This article explores 
Hyderabad and the Indian Union
The history of the awkward place of the princely states in the transfer of power negotiations is well known. 9 On the eve of independence, several large states, Secunderabad would be removed. Soon after the agreement had been struck, however, each side began to accuse the other of violating its terms. The Nizam alleged that the Indian government was imposing an informal embargo by using its control over railways leading into the state to deny the territory vital goods, especially arms and medical supplies. 15 India claimed that the government of Hyderabad was edging towards independence by divesting itself of its Indian securities, banning the Indian currency, halting the export of ground nuts, organising illegal gun-running from Pakistan, and inviting new recruits to its army and to its irregular forces, the Razakars. These moves were regarded in Delhi as part of a 'comprehensive plan to break up the economic cohesion of India.' 16 
The situation in Hyderabad in 1948
While the Nizam attempted to manoeuvre himself towards independence, the internal situation in the territory was deteriorating. The state had been crippled by communist insurgents on the one hand, and forces loyal to the Nizam of Hyderabad on the other.
To a limited extent, Congress volunteers engaged in satyagraha had contributed to During the summer of 1948, the Razakars continued to seek out and eliminate the enemies of the regime. 24 They targeted not only Hindus, but Muslims whose loyalty was in doubt. 25 As it became clear that negotiations with the Indian Union were stalemated, they also courted confrontation with Indian forces. Their raids against trains and villages in Madras, the Central Provinces (CP) and Bombay raised panic in these provinces. In July, Razakars killed six Indian Army troops in an ambush near the Indian enclave of Nanaj. 26 Equally, there were allegations that Indian troops crossed Hyderabad's borders as they gave chase to Razakars. The Government in
Delhi concluded that the increasing influence and violence of these unruly volunteer paramilitaries proved that the Nizam had lost control over his own territory. 33 Clearly, the subtleties and complexities of the Hyderabad situation
were being folded into all-India communal politics. The Government of India, Taylor C. Sherman 9 therefore, concluded that the unrest in Hyderabad threatened to destabilise 'the communal situation in the whole of India'. 34 In the volatile international situation in South Asia in the year following independence,
Nehru had been reluctant to use force to bring Hyderabad into the Indian Union. 35 The Indian economy was suffering a crisis of inflation, accompanied by a panic in the gold market, which impelled the Government of India to re-impose controls on textiles and other essential commodities. In addition, the autumn of 1948 was a tense time for the militaries on the subcontinent. Pakistan had admitted that its troops were present in Kashmir, and Nehru was writing of being at war with its neighbour, albeit an undeclared one. 36 India feared that any move against Hyderabad would prompt a military response from Pakistan. Though Pakistan had no plans to protect Hyderabad with arms, India did not know this. 37 Moreover, the new government in India was trying to calm tensions after the violence of partition, and struggling to provide for millions of refugees. The situation in Hyderabad, they concluded, must be resolved before it adversely affected India's internal and international security. Hindu-Muslim relations, Nehru felt that the decisions which they made in Hyderabad would be seen as the touchstone of the Indian government's minority policy. 38 Before the invasion of Hyderabad, Nehru's primary concern was to normalise HinduMuslim relations there and in the rest of the country. He wrote to Patel that, after the problem of the Razakars, all other issues were 'relatively secondary'. 39 Before the first Indian troop set foot in Hyderabad, there was much uncertainty over whether the police action would provoke an adverse reaction amongst Muslims in India. In the state's surrounding provinces, therefore, provincial governments detained dozens of Muslims, including Members of the Legislative Assembly, for 'security reasons', on the grounds that their sympathies with Hyderabad might spur them into inciting unrest. 40 As troops marched into the state, many Muslims in India lent their support to the police action, however. 41 Prominent Muslims in Delhi publicly welcomed the Government of India's choice to come to the aid of the 'innocent masses' threatened by the Razakars, and appealed for calm. 42 In the event, there was no trouble in India during the five days of the police action. Indeed, before reports emerged of the fighting within the state, Nehru ventured to declare that Hyderabad had 'suddenly opened out a new picture of communal peace and harmony.' Nehru appointed them to tour the state and assess the extent of the destruction, but the original was suppressed and only scraps of it remain. 44 They recorded that after 13 September, there had been a widespread anti-Muslim purge, which had occurred primarily in the Marathwada and Telangana areas. What evidence is available suggests that Hindu residents as well as some members of the Army attacked persons and property in the weeks after the police action began. 45 Conservative estimates suggest that 50,000 Muslims were killed. 46 Others claim several hundred thousand died. 47 Indian troops in some places remained aloof from these activities, in others, they were implicated in them. 48 Sunderlal and Abdulghaffar concluded that, 'In general the attitude of the military officers was good but the soldiers showed bigotry and hatred.' 49 The invasion of Hyderabad had not heralded a new era of communal harmony in the territory. Instead, the main task of the new authorities in the state was to cope with the aftermath of the turmoil.
In order to depose the existing regime and to contain the unrest, the Government of India's police and military authorities had detained Razakars, Hindu militants, communists and many others more loosely connected with the general upheaval.
According to their own figures, the military and police detained over 13,000 Muslims, imprisoned. 50 Indeed, many of the difficulties which the colonial regime had faced when confronting large-scale communal unrest also affected the early postcolonial government: the police and military were disposed to make mass arrests in order to restore order, and to think about prosecution only after the event. But court cases often simply provided another arena for the conflict, and the government came under political pressure to release those detained. 51 Having imprisoned an estimated 17,550 people as they entered the territory, the Government of India was left with the questions of what to do with all the prisoners rounded up in the upheaval, and how to relieve the problem of over-crowded jails.
13
Given the volume of cases, the military regime decided to prosecute only those 'who indulged in the worst kind of atrocities'. 54 In the six months following the Nizam's defeat, therefore, the government released over 11,000 Muslims without trial because no incriminating evidence against them existed. They also deported some 2000 Arabs back to Aden and a similar number of Pathans to 'other parts of India'.
55
Major-General Chaudhuri and his administration planned to prosecute the remainder of those detained. Accordingly, shortly after the proclamation of the State of Emergency, the Government of India propounded a Special Courts Order to dispense with the large numbers of persons in jail. In a word, the order was designed to process cases speedily. To this end, it relaxed the standards of written evidence by requiring only summaries of the evidence rather than full accounts; it made it impossible for an accused to deliberately delay proceedings, e.g. by hunger striking;
and, at first, it provided for no right to appeal to higher courts. This latter provision was amended in October 1949, to allow appeals to the High Court for major offences.
There was no mention either way as to access to a lawyer, and it appears that while some of the accused obtained counsel, others declined or were denied access to one. 56 The ordinance strongly resembled those which had been passed by the colonial government during the twentieth century. For example, it incorporated the lessons which the British had learnt by making it impossible for a defendant to delay a case by hunger striking. 57 In reality, the Special Tribunals were anything but speedy. In each of the courts sat a three-member panel, all of whom had to be present for a case to proceed; when one member was sick or on leave, the tribunal did not meet. Further, English was the working language of the tribunals, but there were few advocates who were able to conduct a prosecution in English. 58 As the trials made halting progress, thousands languished in jails waiting for the police to finish investigating their cases or for the courts to begin their trials. 59 Taylor C. Sherman 
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By April 1949, appeals for an amnesty were gaining volume. Thirteen Urdu newspapers jointly asked the government to free Muslims who had been imprisoned 'on mere suspicion' and had yet to stand trial. The editors suggested that these men had suffered in jail long enough, and that their continued detention would serve no good purpose. To release them would help create a 'harmonious atmosphere' in the state, and it would foster the minority community's confidence in the government. 60 Similarly, Swami Ramandanda Tirtha, leader of the Congress Party in the state, agreed that the institution of cases for events which had occurred nine months before was 'causing great discontent'. 61 The constraints of governance in a democratic state had an impact in three rather contradictory ways on the decisions which the government made about these prisoners. First, as these men had been detained for several months without trial, the International Committee for the Red Cross was pressing Nehru to see that those detained were either prosecuted or released. 62 Nehru had long since realised that the eyes of the world were on Hyderabad and wished to prove that the new Indian Government could be balanced in its approach to both Hindus and Muslims. when it was decided to free all Hindus and to institute a programme for the review of
Muslim cases with an aim to gradually letting many out of jail, the government preferred that the policy be given no publicity. 67 Releases were staggered and former prisoners made to report periodically to the police. Cabinet as the Prime Minister would have preferred. 77 Before the invasion, Nehru had presided over a meeting in which it was decided that, in order to be generous to the Nizam and to create a positive impression on the other princely states, the military regime ought to change as little as possible in Hyderabad. Dramatic administrative and policy changes in the territory were to wait for a democraticallyelected government. 78 At other levels of administration, however, divergent ideas took hold. The new authorities in Hyderabad attempted to adjust the ethnic balance in the executive, police and administrative services, where Muslims predominated.
To this end, they dismissed over a hundred officers, from the Chief Secretary to lowlevel police personnel. 79 They also detained many of those local officers who were suspected of participating in the violence which accompanied the police action. In addition, they attempted to reduce the number of Muslims working in the civil service under a scheme of diarchy had similar ideas. 81 To replace those dismissed, they drafted in junior officers from Bombay, CP and
Madras. This created greater difficulties, however, as many of the new officers were not only inexperienced, but were also unable to speak the languages of the people under their jurisdiction, and were unfamiliar with local conditions. 82 This left the administration generally, and the criminal justice system in particular, unable to function efficiently or effectively. The Prime Minister objected to these schemes on the grounds that they were both inspired by 'communal' chauvinism and impractical because they brought in incompetent outsiders. 83 Nehru, along with many Hyderabadis, called for qualified Hyderabad residents to fill vacant posts. However, the people taking the reigns of power in Hyderabad were able to circumvent these orders by falsifying residency documents. 84 Thus, the answers which were found to the question of the ethnic composition of the services were neither similar, nor coordinated. It is clear that the new Indian government in Delhi, like its British predecessor, had to contend with competing visions of the state. These visions were not identical to those present before 1947, but they were a mark of the continued inability of the centre to elicit discipline and obedience from the individuals it employed.
The Congress party in Hyderabad
The Hyderabad's Swami Ramananda Tirtha, however, had participated in the noncooperation movement in Sholapur, and later made frequent visits to Gandhi. Tirtha often consulted him on matters of policy, though the two did not always agree. 85 In addition, the all-India party had contributed to the Congress satyagraha in the state in 1938. 86 Moreover, the Hyderabad State Congress was also one of the few political organisations which was not confined to a single linguistic group, and which attempted to span the entire state. It would be easier to work with a single organisation rather than with the several linguistic parties.
At the time, however, the Hyderabad State Congress had been in existence for little more than a decade, and had operated as no more than a token institution before 1946. It suffered from organisational shallowness and internal divisions. 87 If it were to take power successfully, the Hyderabad State Congress Party would need all the help it could get from the national party. To this end, when they took over the governance of the state, the Indian authorities ordered the release of all Congressmen who had landed in Hyderabad's jails during their campaign of satyagraha and sabotage before the police action. Before the release, there was some debate as to whether those who had committed crimes of violence should be freed. In the event, Congressmen accused of violent crimes were let out, while communists were kept in jail, whether their crimes involved violence or not. 88 Under these orders, the Government of India released 1222 out of 1736 detenus, and 7893 out of 9218 political prisoners. If the state comprises not only policy, but institutions and individuals, it is difficult to draw a clear and simple picture of the Indian state during the first months after the police action because these three levels seem to be pulling in different directions.
Policy coming from the Government of India level was clearly concerned to appear even-handed in its punishment of participants in the violence which surrounded the deposal of the Nizam's regime. Nehru, at least, was also keen to avoid making drastic changes to state institutions. But as they took control of Hyderabad, the new Indian government found itself with poor institutions and independently-minded local officers. As a result, the composition of the administration in Hyderabad was changed significantly, and Muslims tended to be disenfranchised during this period. The Taylor C. Sherman 
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nature of politics in a democratic state also affected policy, for the centre's decisions were designed to improve the stature of the Congress party, and to appeal to certain members of the electorate. But there were others who were not so easily pleased, and it is to the communists that we now turn.
The communist insurgency and the making of the new state
When they arrived in Hyderabad, the Indian military found that the communists had done great damage to the structures of government in the Telangana region, but that they had also introduced reforms on an impressive scale. The government, therefore, both fought the communists, and learned from them. Or rather, they fought them first, and then they learned from them. Their various encounters with the communists affected the future of India as a whole in many ways. This section will highlight two.
First, some of the oppressive measures used against the movement came to be incorporated into the new nation's constitution. Secondly, the development work of the communists encouraged the government to adopt its own programme of uplift for the peasantry.
While the main justification the Government of India used as they entered Hyderabad was to end the 'communal' violence, they soon found that the problems in the state were intimately related to the communist uprising which was flourishing in the Telangana region of the state, for the violent struggle against the Nizam was centred in Telangana and led by communists. The communists drew adherents from a number of fronts. Amongst the poor peasantry and landless labourers, there was great resentment against the jagirdari system of landholding which governed 43 per cent of land in the state. This system was infamous for the high rate of forced labour extracted from peasants who held little land, were given paltry access to water and manure, and were subjected to high rates by (often absentee) landlords. Moreover, Taylor C. Sherman 
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during the Second World War, the burden of a compulsory levy fell heavily on the peasants who were experiencing similar agrarian troubles to those which plagued the rest of India. Rural areas also lacked facilities for medical care and education. These factors combined with a system in which customary class distinctions were often reinforced with brutal violence to leave a large number of peasants alienated from those who governed them. 94 In addition, urban communists and wealthier peasants had initially fought their own battles under the communist banner, but by 1948, the coalition between poor and middling peasants had fallen apart. 95 In rural areas, the communist cause, led by Ravi Narayan Reddi and organised under the aegis of the Andhra Mahasabha, sought to alleviate the grievances of the poor peasants in the Telangana area. 96 Though at the outset, they only targeted zamindars and deshmukhs, the police and military were pulled into the conflict at the communists had attacked and killed several dozen Razakars. 98 The communists responded with 'punishment' against government officials and suspected collaborators. Their measures were said to be more targeted but equally brutal. 99 Accounts of the action taken by both sides were documented by the Government of India, 100 by politicians such as Sarojini Naidu's daughter, Padmaja Naidu, 101 and they also appeared in the press. 102 When it became clear that the communists had not laid down their arms when the Indian Army arrived, the Military Governor adopted a policy of rooting out communists wherever they were found. Rhetoric was found to match. Nehru Government forces, it was implied, had the right to use force to restore order, and to remove these outlaws from the territory. The means adopted to dislodge the communists were also heavy-handed. By December 1949, the police and military had jailed over 6000 persons without trial, and yet the ranks of communists seemed to be growing. 105 
Fundamental Rights in the Indian Constitution and the situation in Hyderabad
Though these detentions did not have much effect on the communist movement, they did have a profound impact on the shape of the Indian Constitution, which was finalised during this crucial period in the country's history. As the document was being drawn up by the Constituent Assembly, the sub-committee on Fundamental Rights was given the task of articulating the legal, political and social rights of the new citizens of the Republic of India. 106 B.R. Ambedkar drew up a set of rules for arrest and detention which would suit India's unique needs. After many revisions, the substance of Ambedkar's final, multi-part article provided for very little protection against long-term detention without trial. It laid down rights for those arrested or detained, but then stated that these rights did not apply to those held under preventive detention laws which might be passed by the legislatures. 107 Ambedkar justified the text on two grounds. First, India was in great turmoil: refugees, economic crisis, uncertainty over princely states and the rise of communism throughout the country justified the use of preventive detention. Secondly, it was not a 'practical possibility' to expect the current executive, judicial and administrative system to process and review large numbers of detentions, given the current political situation in the country. 108 The infrastructure they had inherited was inadequate for the work at hand. If the constitution were to endow citizens with the right to have their cases reviewed in less than three months, as critics of the clause had suggested, then thousands would have to be released because courts and review boards would fail to meet the deadline.
It would be easy to conclude that these measures signalled the willingness of the Government of India's new leadership to anchor their power in the country by any means necessary. However, the articles adopted in the constitution must be seen in the context of the recent past in India. That most Congressmen had been detained 115 Review committees were constituted to consider the cases of prisoners who were elderly, infirm, or were no threat to security. 116 Within a year over 5000 detenus were freed. 117 Nanjappa substituted the sweeping and heavy-handed operations of the military with small police parties which worked on the basis of intelligence. 118 Home guards and village patrols were organised to assist the police. 119 In the beginning of 1951, Nanjappa gave secret instructions to start a 'whispering campaign' to let it be The authorities also began to build or repair infrastructure from roads and wells to dispensaries and schools. They passed a Tenancy Act, which was designed to improve the rights of tenants by capping landholdings, opening the market to cultivators, and protecting tenants from ejection. 121 Although land reforms were not implemented in a uniform manner, and they did not go far enough in many areas, the Act went some way to recognising peasant grievances. 122 A Tribal Reclamation
Scheme was introduced in Warangal, under which two teams of Social Service
Officers were constituted to 'redress grievances and create contentment' amongst the inhabitants of the area. 123 To this end, they travelled through rural areas, and tried to settle any outstanding disputes, and alleviate all major difficulties in the lives of the villagers. These officers aimed to see that vacant government land was allotted, tenants' rights confirmed, disputes with absentee landlords settled, land taken by moneylenders restored and debts reconciled. Having been allotted a lump sum of two lakhs, and an annual budget of 1.38 lakhs, they arranged for the supply of essential commodities such as cloth, kerosene and iron at subsidised prices. 124 Police and Revenue officials who visited tribal people distributed medicines, sold cheap cloth, and handed out free dhotis, sarees, soap, slates and books. As a result, noted the Deputy Central Intelligence officer with a hint of surprise, 'their cooperation with the forces of law and order in this division is most spontaneous.' 125 They were even helping to capture communists. 126 There are indications in the available documents, however, that these schemes were not without elements of coercion. The hill tribes in the area, the Koyas, Chenchus and Lambadas, were said to have had connections with the communists, who used them as couriers, and their settlements as hide-outs. 127 In order to disrupt the association between the two, the tribes 'were uprooted from their villages inside the Vellodi took power at the head of a civilian administration. Vellodi and Nanjappa 'discovered' that if they could slake the population's thirst for basic goods, the government could win their loyalty as well. And, marking a crucial departure from the British period, they found the funds necessary to achieve this end.
This can be seen as part of a larger, global shift both in the nature of governance more generally and in counter-insurgency tactics in particular. After the second world war, the nature of citizenship changed as the responsibility of the state for the social and economic welfare of its population was greatly expanded. At around the same time, the British, too, began combating the communist insurgency in Malaya with measures designed to ameliorate the economic conditions in the countryside. 136 The leadership of the new Indian nation quickly grasped the notion that if they were to earn and retain the loyalty of the people of India, they would have to fulfil the promises of the nationalist movement and provide uplift for the common people. If they failed in this task, they risked losing the allegiance of villagers, peasantry and labourers to communists who promised the prosperity that the Congress party could not deliver.
The end of Hyderabad
Hyderabad's fate, in the final account, was intimately connected with that of South India as a whole. Since independence, significant sections of the population had urged the Government of India to re-divide the provinces in India along linguistic lines. Hyderabad, situated in the centre of South India, and populated by four distinct linguistic groups, was elemental to this vision of India. Indeed, as the existence of Hyderabad kept these groups from being unified with their linguistic brethren, it was seen by some as the 'centre of gravity of the British Empire in India.' 137 Socialists in the new nation detested the feudal conditions extant in the state, and believed that the system could only be abolished by dismembering every element of the Nizam's regime. 138 The disintegration of Hyderabad, in these views, was essential in order to establish real swaraj in India.
Though he cautioned against repeating the sins of partition, Nehru conceded that, in principle, if there was 'strong and widespread' support for the re-drawing of India's internal borders, then 'a democratic government must ultimately submit to it.' 139 In
Hyderabad, politics had long moved along linguistic lines, and the major players, 
Conclusion
In light of the experience of Hyderabad, how can one characterise the state in independent India? Though this article only concerns Hyderabad, the police military Taylor C. Sherman 
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and bureaucracy which form the basis of this analysis were drafted into the state from outside, and, though one must be cautious, it is possible to draw conclusions which range beyond the borders of the former princely state. It is clear that, while there were some continuities, there were also sharp differences between the colonial and postcolonial state. When the members of the new government took over the institutions left behind by the British, they inherited many of the constraints of the colonial system. Courts were easily overwhelmed by unrest; prisons continued to be used as holding cells, rather than as disciplinary institutions; the police and the military were often clumsy and heavy handed, especially in the first phase of the occupation; and local officers could not always be relied upon to implement the centre's policies as directed. The colonial apparatus simply did not provide the stability and coherence which many scholars have presumed.
The new Government of India was able to integrate Hyderabad into the Indian Union because it was innovative. These innovations were inspired as much by pragmatism as by democratic concerns and ideological change. Because the Congress Party was concerned to assert its influence over the voting population, members of the government tended to formulate policies to serve this end. Intimately connected with the democratic imperative was the new socialist ethos which influenced government policy. Whether inspired by the communists of Telangana, contemporary practices of counter-insurgency, or Nehruvian socialism, the postcolonial state was more directed towards the uplift of Indian villagers. It quickly learned that development programmes could be more effective than coercion in certain circumstances.
Above all, the rulers of independent India were remarkably flexible, particularly during the first few years after 1947. In Delhi and in Hyderabad members of government were not, as a whole, intractably loyal to any single idea. They were willing to adapt their policies to changing facts on the ground. This means that they did not fight all bureaucracy. If later governments were able to secure their tenure by using these institutions, they did so only after significant change. Indeed, the military changed structurally and doctrinally after 1947. 142 And the ranks of the police and bureaucracy expanded remarkably. 143 Historians must now turn our attention to these changes, and we must begin to view the Nehruvian era as a time of uncertainty, dynamism and even contest within the new Indian state.
